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JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES*
Alvin B. Rubin**
THE LEGITIMACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

It was a Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, perhaps the most
acute observer of American society since our nation was founded,
who remarked more than a century ago: "Scarcely any political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later,
into a judicial question."1 The judicial role is even more intrusive
now, in a decade that has seen judges consider the alleged privacy
of papers and tapes produced by the Chief Executive, weigh the
validity of laws forbidding abortion, assess the legitimacy of capital
punishment and take an active role in the supervision of schools,
jails, and a variety of other public institutions.
Those judicial decisions that truly shape American political life
frequently are raised as questions of constitutional interpretation.
The role of courts in our system of government is based on the fact
that the United States as a nation and each of the states that constitute it are governed by written constitutions mandating a division
of powers among the various branches of government-executive,
legislative and judicial. That division, by its very nature, creates the
foundation for the doctrine of judicial review. Because distinctive attributes of the United States Constitution with respect to this doctrine are mirrored by the constitutions of each of the fifty states,
generalizations regarding judicial review in the federal courts may
ordinarily be applied to state judicial review as well.
The doctrine of judicial review may be briefly stated: the courts
are vested with the authority to determine the legitimacy of the
acts of the executive and the legislative branches of the government. The doctrine arose in a restricted context and is sometimes
understood narrowly: when the decision of a case before a court
depends upon the application of a statute or upon the validity of an
executive action, the court has the power and the obligation to
determine whether that statute or act conforms with the provisions
of the applicable constitution. All of the state, as well as the federal
*This article is the text of a paper on the topic of "Interpretation by the Judge of
Written Rules of Law," delivered at a recent annual meeting of the Association Henri
Capitant held in Louisiana.
**Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The author wishes
to express his appreciation to his former law clerk, Peter M. Shane, A.B. Harvard,
1974, J.D. Yale, 1977, Attorney-Adviser, Office of Legal Counsel, United States
Department of Justice, who assisted in every aspect of the preparation of these
remarks.
1.
1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
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courts, are bound preeminently by the federal Constitution, whose
authority is supreme. A constitutional statute controls the court's
decision. An executive act, once determined to be unconstitutional,
will be set aside, and may even give rise to a claim for damages.
The courts have, however, asserted the power of judicial review
broadly. If the validity of an executive action is challenged in litigation as violative of a controlling statute, it is equally the duty of the
judiciary to decide whether or not the executive action is invalid
under the statutory mandate.
For convenience, I will direct my attention in this essay to the
,role of the federal courts with respect to the United States Constitution, although similar observations are of course pertinent when
state courts consider the validity of state statutes or actions of a
state executive under the federal Constitution and the relevant
state constitution. The basic tenet of judicial review is that, where
applicable, the provisions of the United States Constitution must
control judicial decision-making. Chief Justice John Marshall first
addressed the question whether the Congress, as the federal
legislature, has the power to enact a law contrary to the provisions
of the Constitution. In Marbury v. Madison,2 Marshall wrote as if
the answer were self-evident; the Chief Justice asserted as a "proposition too plain to be contested"8 that the Constitution is paramount and a legislative act contrary to its mandates is not law.
Some still do not agree with the early Chief Justice's answer. They
would say that the acts of legislative bodies or of the executive are
themselves the law of the land. If these acts conflict with the Constitution, then the people-and the courts-must abide by the later
wisdom.
However, the very fact that a written constitution has been
adopted seems to buttress Chief Justice Marshall's view. The expression of popular will in the particular form of a written constitution would appear to be valueless if a lawmaker may defy the written words.' The writing itself suggests permanence and
timelessness; it underscores the primacy of the Constitution in
delimiting the powers of each branch of government. The Constitution must control if the limits it imposes on the branches of government-are to be given effect.
The next question to be addressed was troublesome in 1803,
and, to some, it is still vexing today: in whom lies the power to
determine that a statute or an executive action violates the Con2.
3.
4.

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 177.
See A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 3 (1962).
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stitution? The legislature might undertake the task, as might the
Chief Executive, or juries at trial, or the public at the polls through
their ballots. Chief Justice Marshall argued that the power is inherent in the judiciary, originating in its duty to decide cases arising under the Constitution. This duty implied that the courts have
the responsibility to examine and apply that document. Additionally,
the Constitution limits the powers of the legislature; according to
Marshall, these strictures must be enforced by a body other than
Congress. It would be insupportable, Marshall suggests by implication, that each branch of government should construe the Constitution for itself in regard to that branch's own functions. If a court
must apply a statute of Congress to a particular case, it follows, in
Marshall's view, that the courts must determine whether Congress
had the power to enact that statute. Furthermore, since judges take
an oath to support the Constitution, they cannot be expected to
uphold laws repugnant to it.
The degree of popular acceptance enjoyed by the doctrine of
judicial review cannot be attributed entirely to the persuasiveness
of Marshall's argument. It is marred at points with well-noted
sophistry.' First, his decision in Marbury that Congress could not,
conformably with the Constitution, grant to the Supreme Court the
power involved in that case was itself a construction of the Constitution by one branch-the judiciary-interpreting its own functions.
Marshall failed to make clear why courts should inherently enjoy
the privilege of construing the Constitution in regard to their own
function while the Congress should not. Our legislators and executive officers take oaths to support the Constitution that are
every bit as compelling on their face as the oath of the judiciary. On
that basis the other branches would appear to be entrusted equally
with the task of constitutional interpretation. The other branches do
routinely interpret the Constitution in the course of legislating and
administering the law, and those interpretations, though often tacit,
prevail in the working of government unless and until a successful
challenge is brought in a court.
Some have found a rationale for judicial review in the text of
the supremacy clause of the federal Constitution. That clause provides:
5. The legitimacy of judicial review of Congressional action may not have been
controversial at the time Chief Jutice Marshall wrote, and may not have required an
air-tight defense. The power of judicial review was asserted or assumed in a number of
statements made during the Constitutional Convention itself. Similar statements were
made to ratifying conventions in the thirteen states. The FederalistPapers, written to
persuade the people of New York to ratify the proposed Constitution, state that the
power exists, and argue in favor of it. See references to these and other views supporting Chief Justice Marshall's decision in A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 15 (1976).
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This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall
be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding!
In specifying what shall be the. "supreme Law of the Land," the
clause includes "[t]his Constitution" and "Laws made in Pursuance
thereof." If "in Pursuance thereof" means "conformably with," it
follows that laws not conformable to the Constitution are not
supreme and must, under the authority of the Constitution, be
declared null. But this observation only poses again the unanswered
question: who is to decide whether a law conforms to the Constitution?
The supremacy clause, however, does supply another source of
support for judicial review of legislative and executive actions
because of that clause's implications for the structure of American
federalism.7 Though our states are united, they still retain wide
areas of sovereignty. State law is the ordinary source of criminal
law. In addition, state law provides most of our private civil law,
typically regulating the ownership and transfer of property, personal status, marriage and divorce, commercial transactions, and
nearly all of the daily affairs both of individuals and of business.
Nevertheless, the Constitution imposes restrictions on what the
states may do; for example, it explicitly prohibits the states from
passing certain types of laws, such as ex post facto criminal
statutes! The constitutional grant of powers to the federal government in some areas impliedly denies control over those areas to the
states. However, the inhibition on state action may prove to be only
partial, as is the case in the field of admiralty law.
Due to the supremacy of federal law over state law, as dictated
literally by the supremacy clause, and as required functionally for
the growth and stability of a national union, it was essential to have
some method of deciding what state legislation was forbidden. To
leave the question to the individual states would have placed the national interest in the hands of parochialism. National conformity in
areas where it is constitutionally ordained would have been
defeated, not only to the prejudice of legal doctrine, but also to the
detriment of free trade and the easy movement of people and ideas.
The doctrine of nullification, the theory according to which the
states may ignore federal action they deem unconstitutional, died
6.
7.
8.

U.S. CONST. art. 6, 2.
See generally A. Cox, supra note 5, at 19-23.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
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only with the Civil War. Had this theory been adopted, it would
have undermined the progress of American nationalism. Although it
was necessary that the mechanism for review of state law be
federal, it would have been impractical to leave to Congress, a
legislative body, the decision as to which of a multitude of state
statutes did or did not transgress constitutional mandates. Litigation being the most practical method for uncovering conflicts between state law and the Constitution, federal courts became the
natural repository for ultimate constitutional review of state action.
It has been argued that judicial review of federal statutes and
executive actions might have been accepted by the other branches
of government as a kind of "fair play" equivalent, in recognition of
the necessity for federal judicial review of state action.' In fact,
given the overwhelmingly greater frequency with which the federal
power of judicial review has been applied to state, as opposed to
federal action, this concession by Congress and the executive, if genuine, would appear minor indeed.'
There are doubtless other reasons for the popular acceptance of
the doctrine of judicial review. One is a historic distrust, embodied
in the Constitution itself, of the legislature and of the executive. As
pointed out by one writer, the institution of judicial review is a
powerful countermajoritarian force:
Many of those who have talked, lectured, and written about the
Constitution have been troubled by a sense that judicial review
is undemocratic. Why should a majority of nine Justices appointed for life be permitted to outlaw as unconstitutional the
acts of elected officials or of officers controlled by elected officials?"
Alexander Hamilton, a member of the Constitutional Convention, supported judicial review in The Federalist," a series of papers
9. A. Cox. supra note 5, at 23.
10. The most thorough survey available indicates that, since the Supreme Court's
1789 term through its term commencing on October 1, 1975, the Supreme Court has
declared 102 acts of Congress unconstitutional, in whole or in part, as compared to 873
state constitutional and statutory provisions plus an additional 98 local ordinances, all
held unconstitutional on their face or as administered. In the four terms between October, 1972, and July, 1976, the survey shows 9 acts of Congress, 77 state laws, and 5
ordinances held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION, S. Doc. No. 82, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
1597-785 (1973), supplemented by, S. Doc. No. 200, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. S187-203 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as THE CONSTITUTION].
11. Rostow, The Democratic Characterof Judicial Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1952).
12. A. HAMILTON, J. JAY & J. MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Modern Library
ed. 1937).
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published to gain support for ratification of the Constitution.
Hamilton argued that popular sovereignty itself belied the notion
that judicial review was undemocratic:
[Judicial review] only supposes that the power of the people is
superior to both [the legislature and the judiciary]; and that
where the will of the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands
in opposition to that of the people, declared in the Constitution,
the judges ought to be governed by the latter rather than by
the former. 8
Even if judicial review does not imply judicial supremacy, it
does imply a purposeful distrust of pure majoritarianism. The Constitution creates three branches of government; it makes none
supreme. It imposes an elaborate set of checks and balances against
the usurpation of absolute authority by any branch. Separation of
powers, an organic feature of the Constitution, serves the ends of a
society that wishes to be democratic, but not absolutely so; it limits
the roles of the several branches of government and protects the
citizen himself, as well as the branches of government, against
unlawful encroachments from any source. "The root idea of the Constitution is that man can be free because the state is not."' .. As Mr.
Justice Brandeis has said:
The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the
Convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude
the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid
friction, but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the
distribution of govenmental powers among three departments,
5
to save the people from autocracy.1
The regard for judicial review may also imply popular acceptance of the notion that the court is institutionally better equipped
than is the executive or the legislature, to fulfill the role of supreme
arbiter of the Constitution. This idea is only instinctively grasped
and is seldom fully articulated by the public. The Court is not merely
countermajoritarian, it is also insulated from democratic impulse.
The very purpose of a constitution is to ensure that certain enduring values prevail despite the vacillating moods of the moment, and
that certain rights and privileges be provided even where they are
unpopular. Democracies, of course, flourish elsewhere in the world
without judicial review. American public acceptance of judicial
review depends more on the nation's historical experience and on
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 506.
Rostow, supra note 11, at 195.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).

JUDICIAL REVIEW

19791

the nature of the Constitution of the United States than on any inherent superiority of courts in exercising the ultimate interpretational function.
The Supreme Court itself has helped to secure acceptance for
judicial review through the recognition of significant limitations on
the doctrine, including those limitations imposed by the Constitution, as well as some limitations created by the Court. Because the
Constitution restricts the jurisdiction of the Court to "cases and controversies," the Court has held that it may not render advisory opinions,"6 pass on the constitutionality of legislation in advance, or
decide moot issues. It may not act as counsel to Congress or to the
President; it passes on constitutionality only when necessary to the
decision of a case pending before it. The Court has derived further
limitations to judicial review; for example, the Court will not rule on
what it calls "political issues." This limitation is not a bar to the
Court's review of all politically sensitive issues, such as whether
states may proscribe abortions or whether the New York Times
may be enjoined from publishing the Pentagon Papers. Rather, the
Court has held that those questions deemed to be entrusted by the
Constitution to another branch of the government for final resolution are by the Constitution itself put beyond the scope of judicial
review.
Professor Charles Black, Jr. has noted that judicial review
enables the Court not only to restrain legislative and executive action but also to perform the function he calls a "legitimizing one.917
When the Court strikes down the action of another branch, it is
restricting the operations of that branch; but when it upholds the
constitutionality of that conduct, it validates the statute or action involved. This validation, however motivated, is significant because
the American symbol of nationhood is the Constitution, and no
legitimation is greater than the imprimatur of the Supreme Court,
as the concrete embodiment of the Constitution. 8
This function of the Supreme Court underscores the Court's
stabilizing influence, the disruptive potential of judicial review notwithstanding. As the late Professor Alexander Bickel, a leading constitutional scholar, observed, the Court is: "seen as a continuum. It
is never like other institutions, renewed at a single stroke. No one
or two changes on the Court, not even if they include the advent of
a new Chief Justice, are apt to be as immediately momentous as a
turnover in the presidency."" Bickel also noted that "[clontinuity is
16.

State practice, notably in Massachusetts, does not always follow this doctrine.

17.

C. BLACK,

18.
19.

A. BICKEL. supra note 4, at 31.
Id.

THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT

(1960).
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a chief concern of the Court, as it is the main reason for the Court's
place in the heart of its countrymen."2
This discussion of the legitimacy of judicial review has focused
chiefly on the Court's interpretation of legislative acts. The growth
of bureaucratic government and the burgeoning of the federal executive branch suggest that the role of the federal judiciary in
reviewing the constitutionality or statutory validity of executive actions, federal as well as state, will increase. The Watergate cases
demonstrate the profound importance of this function, and the
Court's willingness to face up to it. However, time and further study
will be necessary before we fully understand whether the rationales
so long accepted with respect to judicial review of congressional
acts can be generalized with respect to the review of executive functions as well. In considering this problem, one might question
whether, had the Supreme Court enjoined Abraham Lincoln from
fighting the Civil War, history would have looked kindly on the
President for obeying that injunction.2' In some instances, for example in the case of Japanese confinement during World War II, the
Court has found it comfortable not to interfere with executive action
that it might, in more placid times, have considered invalid.2
The viability of the doctrine of judicial review, as applied to any
branch of the federal government or to the states, depends upon a
consensus of respect for the Court. The Court has no power to enforce its decrees against the executive; it relies on the executive to
enforce its decrees against all others. It possesses:
neither the purse nor the sword. Constitutionalism as a constraint upon government depends, in the first instance, upon the
habit of voluntary compliance and, in the last resort, upon a people's realization that their freedom depends upon observance of
the rule of law. The realization must be strong enough for the
community to rise up and overwhelm, morally and politically,
any notable offender. 3
There is yet another reason why the courts' role in constitutional interpretation is of the greatest importance. I reach it last
because it raises what, for judges, is the most perplexing
methodological problem posed by a system of law that is governed
by a written constitution- the problem of giving contemporary
meaning to a purportedly timeless, but largely unspecific statement
20. Id. at 32.
21. Professor Charles Black, Jr. of Yale Law School made this point, and I am
happy to acknowledge his priority.
22. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
23. A. Cox. supra note 5, at 7.
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of general principles. Particularly in the first ten amendments,
ratified by each state as a single package between 1789 and 1791,24
the Constitution employs general and sweeping clauses. In areas
where the Constitution is specific, for example, where it requires
that the President be thirty-five years of age, the prerogative of
constitutional review imparts little power to the interpreter.
However, a limitation that Congress shall make no law that abridges
the freedom of speech or of the press, is not by its nature capable of
precise application. No computer can determine with unerring accuracy whether a person has been deprived, as the Constitution forbids, of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Such a
provision demands a mechanism for interpretation that will give it
operative meaning. The inherent necessity for interpretation that
such clauses embody generates obvious difficulties; the duty to interpret and the power to execute that duty are attended not only by
grave responsibilities, but also by intricate problems of divining the
significance to be given mandates that are almost oracular.
THE JUDGE'S APPROACH TO JUDICIAL REVIEW

I have so far discussed the legitimacy of judicial review and, by
implication, some of the responsibilities attending that process. How
a judge confronted with the necessity of deciding a constitutional
issue approaches its resolution, like the broader riddle as to how a
judge decides any perplexing case, is probably an unanswerable
question. There are perhaps some judges, only a few I hope, who
secretly decide merely on the result they would like to reach for
political or personal reasons, and then find some plausible rationale
for it. Even these judges may be hard pressed to know the ultimate
reason why they behave as they do.
Most judges, however, consider that it is part of their task to
reach a conclusion based on comprehensible logic and on factors that
may in a juridical sense properly be weighed, and then to set forth
both process and conclusion in a written opinion. This written opinion is of particular importance in our judicial system that, like our
society, celebrates the individual. Each judge joins in the opinion as
an individual. If he agrees with the result, but differs with the rationale, he may write a separate concurrence. If he differs with the
result, in whole or in part, he may dissent. In any event, each judge
states in some way the thought processes that make a certain result
24. Ratification of the first ten amendments required approval of three-fourths of
those states that had entered the union prior to their adoption. Three original states,
Massachusetts, Georgia, and Connecticut did not in fact ratify the Bill of Rights until
1939. THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 10, at 25-26 n.2.
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appear to him to be legally correct. It is impossible at this stage of
psychological knowledge for any of us to know definitely whether
this process masks from even the most dedicated judge the operations of his subconscious and makes his opinion the mere rationalization of a result-oriented decision, based on bias or sheer emotion.
Nor is it possible to know whether this process is based on judicial
reasons not fully articulated, or whether the exposition given by thejudge is ornamentation rather than a true account of the process.
Let us assume that the judge is conscientious and faithful to at
least some sound jurisprudential doctrine. Not only does he believe
that the case requires a considered decision, but he also regards the
duty to explain his decision in a written opinion as one calling for
honesty and candor. On this basis, we can review the interpretational methods open to him, attempt to discern how the judge's
awareness of his responsibilities affects his use of those techniques,
and try to convey a sense of what judicial review requires of the
jurist-reviewer.
Among American scholars, lawyers, and judges, profound differences exist concerning the proper approach to constitutional interpretation. To some extent, these differences are matters of emphasis, rather than of insistence or disavowal. At the poles of the
debate, however, are two basic views, a comparison of which may be
helpful.
One set of commentators urges a principally literal and
historical reading of the Constitution. Justice John Harlan, one of
our great conservative judges, represented this point of view; he
argued that the Supreme Court should be guided by the express intent and understanding of the men who prepared the Constitution in
Philadelphia almost 200 years ago. Change should be left to the process of amendment.
Even a literal reading of the Constitution together with the
historical evidence of the intention of the framers may, of course,
lead different readers to different conclusions; nevertheless, the
standard by which any result should be measured under this theory
is rooted somewhere in the past. This approach recommends itself in
constitutional theory, as it does also in the interpretation of codes,
contracts, and other legally important documents, because we must
naturally assume that one motive for reducing legal obligations to
writing is the desire to express controlling principles as clearly and
as unalterably as possible, avoiding a continual quest for elusive
precepts.
Opposed to the historical method of interpretation is the socalled liberal view of the Constitution, an approach that seems largely
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to have prevailed in the last quarter century. This view holds that
the written Constitution embodies principles that may evolve, and
indeed transform, in the light of changed events. This school accommodates many different and conflicting attitudes. It includes activists who would reflect in every judicial decision the result they
think that contemporary needs demand, and it embraces those who
view constitutional flexibility as one of gradual accommodation of
fundamental principles to changing social and political conditions.
There is extensive literature discussing the evolutionary method of
constitutional interpretation;" indeed, one liberal scholar, Professor
Charles L. Black, recommends the accommodation of change as a
kind of faithfulness to a timeless political system that the Constitution mandates. Professor Black advocates a departure from the basic
method of "purported explication or exegesis of the particular textual passage considered as a directive of action," and the adoption of
a method of inference from the structures and relationships created
by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal part."20
These opposed views of the Constitution and of constitutional interpretation do not, however, each result in a pattern by which the
decisions of judges can be predicted, given a knowledge of a judge's
political beliefs and jurisprudential philosophy. It is impossible to
say boldly that, the more activist a judge, the less inclined he is to
adopt the fetters of judicial restraint in decision-making; nor is it
possible to conclude that judges more resistant to change are likely
to resist not only liberal constitutional interpretation, -but even
decisive consideration of constitutional issues themselves. Such
sweeping generalizations offer no sure basis for forecasting the decision of the judge.
A literal reading of the Constitution may not result in what has
been called "strict construction," which in Nixonian terms meant
"political conservatism." Justice Black's precise reading of the
words of the first amendment led him to opinions of the most liberal
sort. That amendment says, "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . ." Justice Black
understood this to forbid any statute or rule of decision that would
attach unfavorable legal consequences to speech; thus, he would
have held unconstitutional all actions for damages for defamation of
character. The type of conservative admired by so-called strict constructionists would reach exactly the opposite conclusion.
25. For a recent book attacking the evolutionary method of constitutional interpretation, see R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977). For a dramatically different point of view, see C.
BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).
26. C. BLACK, supra note 25, at 7.
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Even with respect to questions without obvious emotional impact, the problems of literal reading may divide a court. Let us take
as an example the following constitutional provision: "No state shall,
without the Consent of Congress ....
enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State .
... " In Northwestern States
8
Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,"
the Supreme Court held that
the net income from the interstate operations of a corporation
organized in one state might be subjected to taxation by the various
states in which the corporation does business. Thereafter, a number
of states agreed to share information and act together to determine
the tax liability to each state of such multi-state corporations.
In February, 1978, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of this agreement in United States Steel Corp. v.
Multistate Tax Commission.' The Court immediately acknowledged
that the constitutional provision quoted, read literally, made the interstate agreement invalid. However, if the clause were read in this
fashion and applied to the utmost limits, it would forbid any kind of
contract between the states, including any sale of property, any informal ageement, and any mutual cooperation based on agreement.
The "Compact Clause could not have been intended to reach every
possible interstate agreement."8 Therefore, it became necessary to
construe its terms by reference to the object sought to be achieved
by the clause. The Court concluded that the clause forbids only
those agreements that have an adverse impact on the federal structure, as discerned by the Court.
Of course, the clause does not by its own terms thus restrict its
applicability. It is categorical. Even the two justices who dissented
in United States Steel Corp. conceded that many interstate
agreements are legally effective without congressional consent.
Their view would invalidate this compact because it was so complex
and had such a potential effect on non-compact states that congressional sanction was required. Thus neither the majority nor the dissent was willing to be confined to the text of the Constitution even
though it appears clear on its face.
Hence, we perceive a willingness by justices of different views
to look beyond the precise words of the Constitution. This does not
mean abandonment of the text. In United States Steel Corp., the
Court was guided by the purpose of the constitutional clause, the
structure of the federal-state relationship involved, and the implications of its decision with respect to state actions that might be
27.
28.
29.
30.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3.
358 U.S. 450 (1959).
434 U.S. 432 (1978).
Id. at 468.
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beneficial to the state and helpful, or at least not harmful, to the
federal polity. We will return to some of these factors in a moment.
Judges must achieve some balance between iron literalism and
absolute accommodation to contemporary moods. Good judgment,
moreover, entails a sensitivity to the symbolic, as well as to the
functional aspect of a court's constitutional role. People and constitutions ordinarily resist sudden, dramatic change in favor of alteration
by gradual evolution. Doctrine should evolve, not spring full-blown
from the brows of a majority of nine. There will be only rare instances when it is better to decide dramatically. In those exceptional
cases, doctrine, public mood, and surrounding circumstances may
dictate, in the words of Macbeth: "If't were done, 'twere better it
were done quickly."
Precedent, of course, is an important safeguard; it fosters continuity and confidence. Courts build on prior decisions. Though
precedent is not all-commanding, it must be such that the other
branches of government and the citizenry are able to act without
daily anxiety that the law is quicksilver or that particular decisions
are as unpredictable as the throw of dice or the whims of
tomorrow's judges. Through precedent, courts benefit from the
lessons of prior experience. Yet the Supreme Court has not considered that the rule of stare decisis applies in judicial review. We
are guided by the past but not confined by yesterday's errors.
The judge who decides constitutional issues must be impressed
by the possible permanence of his decision. One can only speculate
concerning the thought processes of those who sit on the Supreme
Court, the tribunal whose decisions are the most permanent in our
judicial hierarchy. Nevertheless, as all judges know, there is a pervasive difference between decisions of constitutional issues and
determinations of the results in ordinary civil and criminal trials. In
ordinary civil litigation, it is of some importance merely to resolve a
dispute. In the run-of-the-docket case, community peace demands
that argument and litigation be ended. In many complex, borderline
cases, it is nearly impossible to ordain one result definitively right
and condemn another as indubitably wrong. In some situations, we
deliberately adopt elastic standards, expecting that judges may
reach different conclusions in applying them. One of the desiderata
in such cases is merely that a neutral authority reach a fair decision
on some reasonable basis. Community welfare is enhanced by the
end of ordinary civil disputes, and social order is rarely disrupted by
the enrichment or impoverishment of the individuals involved.
Democratic judicial systems all act more carefully in matters of
criminal law. Even an ordinary case obviously affects the whole life
of the individual defendant. The community's values are also more
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directly engaged. Hence, the litigation process in criminal cases
tends to be more consciously deliberative and the search for
ultimate truth, so far as it may be ascertainable, more serious.
However, even in criminal cases involving grave charges, the decision is not usually one that affects a nation's future.
In matters of constitutional interpretation, however, judges do
more than adjudicate the results of past conduct; they determine
what the legislature or the executive or the courts may or may not
do in the future. The result is not merely of prospective impact; it
may be unalterable by the democratic process. If a judge interprets
a statute in a manner that the legislature disapproves, or reaches a
decision that offends the legislative wishes, the legislature may
amend the statute or adopt a new one, thus changing the law. Overcoming constitutional decisions that forbid legislative solution,
however, by any means other than judicial reconsideration, requires
constitutional amendment. This amendment process is so difficult
that only in rare instances-sixteen times in our national
history-has the basic document, which includes the first ten amendments, been altered.
Moreover, in our federal system, while judges are appointed for
life, they are not political ingenues. They have been nominated as a
result of a political process, and most have some considerable
familiarity with the necessary compromises of our democratic procedures. Such a judge must be conscious that he is neither elected
initially, nor is he subject to scrutiny at the polls once appointed.
Recognizing his non-elected status, the judge reviews the actions of
persons who have some kind of popular mandate: lawmakers, the
chief executive, or lesser officials appointed by the executive to
whose actions the elective process may respond. The judge must be
aware that the vox populi has designated others to manage the
business of government. He has neither an organized constituency
to support him, nor an elective process to ratify or disavow his actions expressly.
Such considerations undoubtedly affect judges' notions not only
for what constitutional interpretation is proper, but also of when
particular issues are ripe for decision. The jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is today based chiefly on writs of certiorari. This
means that the Court must consent to hear most of the cases that it
adjudicates, and it does so only on a small percentage of those occasions when its opinions is sought-about eight per cent of the
cases."1 What distinguishes such cases is primarily the importance of
the issues they raise. But the denial of certiorari, without reasons,
31.
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may itself be a way to avoid hearing issues that the Court simply
deems not ready for judicial decision.
Notwithstanding this catalogue of factors militating for judicial
caution, the duty of judicial review remains a national imperative to
the judge. As Professor Herbert Wechsler has said:
[Judicial review is] not that of policy or advising legislatures or
executives, nor even, as the uninstructed think, of standing as
an ever-open forum for the ventilation of all grievances that
draw on the Constitution for support. It is the duty to decide
the litigated case and to decide it in accordance with the law,
with all that implies as to a rigorous insistence on the satisfaction of procedural and jurisdictional requirements ...."
If judges were paralyzed by the enormity of this task, our constitutional system would break down. The duty must be performed
and the results of the process measured ultimately by what each
person, making his own assessment of the nation's needs, would call
"good judgment."
A good decision, a decision that ought to command respect
whether or not it is conclusively correct, ordinarily manifests certain recognizable characteristics. The first might be described as a
seriousness of purpose. The logic of an opinion should demonstrate a
genuine attempt to understand what the Constitution means. A
judge should be self-consciously eclectic where the text is not itself
decisive he should consider its historical background and the future
implications of all possible decisions. The attempt should be neither
to perpetuate an ancestral ideal nor to create a particular future,
but to enrich one's reasoning as much as possible by all information
relevant to a just result.
A second desirable element comprises both a personal and an institutional selflessness. The process of judicial review is prostituted
if the sole criterion for decision is whether a result will serve or
retard the judge's personal interests or the values he avows. The
relevant standards must be supported, as much as possible, by
authority beyond the judge's personal predilections. The aim is to
achieve a decision that may justly be called "principled." Professor
Wechsler has defined a principled decision as "one that rests on
reasons with respect to all the issues in the case, reasons that in
their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result
that is involved." 8 Moreover, the judge must consider what Pro32. Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciples of ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REV.
1, 6 (1959).
33. Id. at 19.
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fessor Black aptly calls the structural arrangement of government
embodied in the Constitution.
This sort of selflessness also includes a judicial respect for the
other branches of government. For example, in reviewing executive
action, it is appropriate to consider whether the Constitution requires a certain result at all costs and in all events, or whether the
invalidity of the action presently being reviewed may be remedied
by legislative action to provide some other solution such as,
perhaps, some other kind of due process. Thus, the rule that
evidence obtained unconstitutionally may not be used in a trial, embodied in Weeks v. United States,8" and in Mapp v. Ohio,85 rests in
part on a judicial effort to restrain law-breaking by police officers in
the executive department of the federal government and the states.
The cases hint, and many scholars teach, that, if the Congress
should provide some other adequate solution to police misconduct,
the judicial suppression rule might yield. These hints suggest to the
judge that, in reflecting on the results of judicial review, he should
consider the possibility that the Constitution does not require only
one result, but may offer the possibility of several valid approaches.
Another safeguard lies in the future; the true appraisal of the
correctness of any judicial decision is not made by judges, by
lawyers, or by law professors, but by the muse of history. I have
spoken of the near-unalterability of constitutional decisions by nonjudicial bodies. Future judges, however, may alter or modify our
present efforts. Whether a judge's decision today on the perplexing
issues he faces is correct or incorrect cannot be decided by the
newspapers, by the law journals, or by scholars who write in the
heat and temper of the times. Ultimate judgment lies ahead. History
will have little tolerance for even those reasonable judgments that
have gone wrong." For those of us who today perform the duty of
judicial review, it is possible and necessary to have faith both that
we can discern what is correct and that if we are mistaken, other
judges may be able in the course of history to correct our errors in
a manner denied to those whose actions are irretrievable.
34.
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